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Abstract
In this paper, we ask whether courts should continue to rule settlements in the
context of pharmaceutical claims per se legal, when these settlements comprise
payments from originator to generic companies, potentially delaying generic en-
try compared to the underlying litigation. Within a theoretical framework we
compare consumer welfare under the rule of per se legality with that under al-
ternative standards. We find that the rule of per se legality induces maximal
collusion among settling companies. In comparison, the rule of per se illegality
entirely prevents collusion and the rule of reason induces limited collusion when
antitrust enforcement is subject to error. Contrary to intuition, limited collusion
can be welfare enhancing as it increases companies’ expected settlement profits
and thus fosters generic entry. Generic companies obtain additional incentives
to challenge probabilistic patents, which potentially leads to overall increased
competition. We further show that generic entry is fostered more effectively by
inducing limited collusion than by rewarding first generic entrants with an ex-
clusivity right.
Keywords: antitrust and intellectual property law, patent settlements, collu-
sion, per se rule, rule of reason, Hatch-Waxman Act
JEL classification: I18, K40, L40, O34
FI wish to thank Klaus M. Schmidt as well as Florian Englmaier, Bernhard Ganglmair, John M.
Golden, Stuart Graham, C. Scott Hemphill, Fabian Herweg and Johannes Maier for helpful conver-
sations. I am also thankful to participants at the Annual Conference of the EPIP Association 2010
in Maastricht, at the Annual Conference of EALE 2010 in Paris, at the IMPRS-CI/ETH Workshop
2010 in Wildbad-Kreuth, at CISS 2010 in Turunc, and at seminars of the Columbia University, the
IMPRS-CI and the University of Munich for useful comments and suggestions.
GLinda Gratz, International Max-Planck Research School for Competition and Innovation (IMPRS-
CI), Marstallplatz 1, 80539 Mu¨nchen, Germany. E-mail: l.gratz@yahoo.de.
1
1 Introduction
The generic company Barr Pharmaceuticals recently received $398.1 million from the
originator company Bayer AG for giving up an invalidity claim and stopping the pro-
duction of a generic version of Bayer’s antibiotic Cipro until the end of patent exclu-
sivity. The question arises why originator companies would want to settle on such
unfavorable terms. If they held ironclad patents, they could exclude their competitors
through litigation, merely paying litigation costs. There is strong indication that in
cases like this, in which the patent holders make large payments to the alleged in-
fringers, the patents at issue are in fact not ironclad but probabilistic, meaning with
positive probability the patents would be declared invalid or non-infringed by court.
In these cases, the expected generic entry date under litigation lies prior to the end of
patent exclusivity, which implies that originator and generic companies can use settle-
ments to delay generic entry compared to litigation. Large payments from originator
to generic companies are then rationalized as a reimbursement for the entry delay and
as a share in the surplus generated through the entry delay.
So, originator and generic companies potentially restrict competition through pay-
for-delay settlements, delaying generic entry compared to the litigation alternative.1
Under antitrust law, agreements that restrict competition are per se illegal as they
lead to static inefficiency. The present legal standard in the US, however, stipulates
that pay-for-delay settlements are per se legal. Since the originator companies still
hold valid patents at the time of settlement, it has been argued that the application
of antitrust rules would be inadmissible. In Bayer vs. Barr, for instance, the District
Court reasoned that any anticompetitive effects were “within the exclusionary zone
of the patent”, and thus could not be redressed by antitrust law. So currently, US
courts act on the presumption that granted patents are ironclad as long as there has
not been a declaratory judgment to the contrary. In light of the probabilistic nature
of the patents at issue the question arises, whether this is desirable. Should courts
continue to rule pay-for-delay settlements per se legal or apply an alternative rule,
either the rule of per se illegality or the rule of reason? Under both these alternative
rules antitrust law would be applied. Under the rule of per se illegality courts would
rule settlements that comprise value transfers from originator to generic companies per
se illegal. In contrast, under the rule of reason courts would inquire into the market
conditions more comprehensively, balancing pro- against anticompetitive settlement
1For a survey on pay-for-delay settlements see Hemphill (2009).
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effects. The question, which rule toward pay-for-delay settlements yields the highest
consumer welfare, is important also in light of the fact that in the EU regulation of
pay-for-delay settlements is still in its infancy.2 We try to answer this question within
a theoretical analysis.
In our framework, originator companies have entered a marketplace for pharmaceu-
ticals with patented products. Because the patents are probabilistic, generic companies
contemplate market entry with generic products prior to the patents’ expiration. In
case of generic entry patent disputes are triggered, resulting in either litigations or
settlement agreements. Both parties view settlements superior to litigations as the
settlement profits they can obtain are at least as high as the expected litigation profits.
When settling, the companies decide on generic entry dates and if permitted on value
transfers. Settlements are ruled by courts. We apply the consumer welfare standard
to assess which rule is favorable in practice.
Since under the rule of per se legality value transfers within settlements are legal,
companies can maximize their joint profits by colluding maximally. That is, they can
maximize their joint profits by delaying generic entry until the end of patent duration
(as in the case of Bayer vs. Barr). Under the rule of per se illegality value transfers
from originator to generic companies within settlements are illegal, so that originator
companies cannot compensate generic companies for a delay in entry compared to lit-
igation. Thus, settling companies agree upon entry terms that would in expectation
result under litigation and are entirely prevented from colluding. Under the rule of
reason settling companies are allowed to transfer values but courts prohibit those set-
tlements that they regard anticompetitive. We take into consideration that under the
rule of reason courts might make errors when evaluating settlements. Our analysis
reveals that imprecise evaluations induce settling companies to collude. The reason
is that the likelihood that anticompetitive settlements get approved increases when
courts’ evaluations become less precise. It then pays more for the companies to choose
particularly late generic entry dates. Thus, the more antitrust enforcement is subject
to error under the rule of reason, the more settling companies collude.
Intuitively, these results speak for an amendment toward the rule of per se illegality
as only under this rule collusion can entirely be prevented. However, as a main result we
2Since 2008 the European Commission (EC) publishes monitoring reports on pay-for-delay set-
tlements (see EC 2008, 2009, 2010). Since 2009, it opened first formal antitrust investigations in
a number of pay-for-delay settlements for suspected breaches of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (see MEMO/09/322, IP/10/8, IP/11/511 and
IP/11/1228). Generally, it advocates restrictions on pay-for-delay settlements.
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show that, contrary to intuition, collusion can be beneficial. We presume that generic
companies’ incentives to challenge probabilistic patents are restricted due to the high
additional costs that challenge processes necessitate. The possibility of collusion there-
fore provides generic companies additional incentives to challenge probabilistic patents
as it increases their expected settlement profits. Additional settlement agreements re-
sult where otherwise the holders of probabilistic patents would remain monopolists.
As long as collusion under the additional settlements is limited, competition increases,
affecting consumer welfare positively.
Under the rule of per se legality settling companies collude maximally, so that con-
sumer welfare does not increase due to the additional patent challenges. Therefore, the
rule of per se legality yields the lowest consumer welfare compared to the alternative
rules. The rule of reason has the paradoxical advantage over the rule of per se illegal-
ity that it induces limited collusion, thereby enhancing generic companies’ incentives
to challenge probabilistic patents. We show that the rule of reason outperforms the
rule of per se illegality when generic companies’ incentives to enter are low. In that
case, the benefit adhered to collusion, i.e., the benefit of additional settlement agree-
ments, outweighs the cost adhered to collusion, i.e., the cost that under each settlement
competition is restrained.
We make a critical assessment of this first result by asking whether there exist alter-
native incentive mechanism to foster generic entry that are more effective than permit-
ting collusion between originator and generic companies. The US Hatch-Waxman Act
of 1984 potentially provides such an alternative incentive mechanism. It stipulates that
generic companies first challenging a patent obtain 180 days of marketing exclusivity
during which no subsequent generic company may enter. As a second result we find
that this prominent incentive device does in fact not have the desired incentive effect
and is detrimental to consumer welfare.
In our welfare analysis we only consider effects on static efficiency, resulting from
competition among existing products. We therefore discuss whether a welfare analysis
requires to also consider dynamic efficiency, resulting from the creation of new prod-
ucts. Static and dynamic efficiency might go hand in hand. Nevertheless, under the
consideration of dynamic efficiency collusion could have the additional beneficial effect
that it also increases originator companies’ expected settlement profits and thus their
incentives to innovate. But the possibility of collusion could as well impair dynamic
efficiency as it has the effect that originator companies are able to obtain relatively high
profits with weak inventions, which might negatively bias their investment decisions.
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In the previous literature the vast majority of researchers also argues for an amend-
ment of the current legal approach. Willig and Bigelow (2004) and Addanki and Daskin
(2008) argue in favor of the rule reason because it allows for payments from origina-
tor to generic companies and such payments could for various reasons be necessary to
facilitate procompetitive settlements.3 However, they do not take into account that
under the rule of reason courts might make errors in their evaluations and approve
anticompetitive settlements. As briefly mentioned by Salinger, Ippolito, and Schrag
(2007), when there exists the chance that anticompetitive settlements get approved,
this might induce companies to conclude not pro- but anticompetitive settlements.4
Our analysis accounts for the fact that antitrust evaluations under the rule of rea-
son might be subject to error. To the best of our knowledge this is the first formal
analysis in which the welfare effects of the different legal rulings toward pay-for-delay
settlements are compared.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we outline the model. Section
3 analyzes to what extent settling companies collude and how high generic companies’
incentives to contest probabilistic patents are under the different rules. In Section 4,
we determine how the legal ruling affects welfare. Section 5 assesses the welfare effects
of the Hatch-Waxman Act provisions. Results are discussed in Section 6 and Section
7 concludes.
2 The Model
We analyze a marketplace for pharmaceuticals, which originator companies (denoted
O) have entered with patented products. For each patented product there are two
companies sequentially seeking market entry with generic products prior to the patents’
expiration.5 At time t = 0 the first generic companies (denoted G1) decide on entry,
and at time t = λ, with λ ∈ (0, 1], the second generic companies (denoted G2) decide
3Other authors arguing that the majority of pay-for-delay settlements should be procompetitive,
include Blair and Cotter (2002), Crane (2002), Langenfeld and Li (2003) and Schildkraut (2004).
4Bulow (2003), Hemphill (2006, 2009), Hovenkamp, Janis and Lemley (2003), Leffler and Leffler
(2004), Lemley and Shapiro (2005), O’Rourke and Brodley (2003), and Shapiro (2003) also argue that
pay-for-delay settlements should create a presumption of anticompetitive behavior.
5We consider the case of two generic companies sequentially seeking market entry because in Section
5 we want to investigate the welfare effects of the Hatch-Waxman Act provisions, which stipulate that
generic companies first entering award an exclusivity right which delays subsequent generics’ entry.
Further, the FTC (2002) reports that at most two generic companies challenged probabilistic patents
in the past. This number is lower than the number of generic companies seeking market entry after
patent expiration because a challenge process necessitates additional costs, amounting to $1 million.
Our results would also hold for simultaneous entry when λ = 0. We do not consider this case explicitly
for the sake of brevity.
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on entry. Patent exclusivity ends at time t = 1.
When entering, the generic companies trigger patent disputes. They incur a fixed
cost fg, which consists of proving bioequivalence and of bringing forward a detailed
description of why they believe that the originator’s patent is invalid or non-infringed.
These fixed costs are not precisely known by other companies. The patent disputes
result in either litigations or settlement agreements. As will be shown in Section 3, both
parties view settlements as superior to litigations because the profits they can obtain
by settling are at least as high as expected litigation profits.6 However, the expected
outcome of litigation is the basis for negotiation in the settlement talks. If negotiations
break down and no bargain can be reached, the expected outcome of litigation is the
value the players receive. When settling, the companies decide on generic entry dates
and if permitted on value transfers.7
Nature determines the probabilities with which courts would declare the patents
valid under litigations. These probabilities, denoted by γ, are common knowledge to
originator and generic companies, and uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, i.e.,
γ ∼ U [0, 1].8 The probability of patent validity reflects the strength of the patents.
When γ equals zero a patent is invalid, and when γ equals one a patent is ironclad.9
Under litigations generic entry would be uncertain. With probability γ courts
would declare the patents valid and generic entry would occur at the end of patent
duration, i.e., at t = 1, whereas with probability 1−γ courts would declare the patents
invalid and generic entry would occur immediately (G1 would enter at t = 0 and G2
would enter at t = λ).10 By contrast, under settlements the companies can agree
on any certain future entry date tg1 ∈ [0, 1] and tg2 ∈ [λ, 1]. In order to be able
to compare the uncertain entry dates under litigations with the certain entry dates
under settlements, we make use of a continuous time model without discounting. We
compute probabilistic weightings of the uncertain entry dates under litigations, which
6Further reasons why companies prefer settlements can be that settlements costs are lower than
litigation costs and that settlements provide legal certainty (see appendices A3 and A4).
7Likewise, settling parties could restrict competition by agreeing upon per-unit royalty rates, a
fixed price, quantity-restrictions, territory dispartments or mergers. We assume that these other
settlement forms are regulated such that none of them yields higher returns than ongoing litigation.
8In Appendix A3, we deal with cases in which the companies misperceive γ.
9In practice, expected settlement profits also depend on the commercial value of the patents.
Further, patents might be strong but easy to ‘´invent around’. The results we obtain regarding patents
of low strength γ also hold true for patents of high commercial value and patents non-infringed with
probability γ.
10We assume that a dispute is triggered and resolved at the same point in time. If we denoted two
separate points in time, both parties’ reference entry dates would postpone, and with it the entry
dates under the rule of per se illegality and under the rule of reason. The welfare implications would
not change.
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we will refer to as expected entry dates under litigations. G1’s expected entry date
under litigation is tlg1 = γ · 1 + (1 − γ) · 0 = γ since under litigation G1 enters with
probability γ at time t = 1 and with probability (1 − γ) at time t = 0.11 For settling
companies as well as consumers this entry date is of equal value as a γ percent chance
of G1 entering at the end of patent duration (at t = 1) and a 1 − γ percent chance
of G1 entering immediately (at t = 0).
12 Accordingly, G2’s expected entry date under
litigation is tlg2 = γ · 1 + (1− γ) · λ as under litigation G2 enters with probability γ at
time t = 1 and with probability 1− γ at time t = λ.
Suppose, for example, that at the point in time G1 challenges O’s patent, the
remaining life of the patent is 10 years and the probability of patent validity 20 percent
(i.e., γ = 0.2). Then, G1’s expected entry date under litigation is equal to 2 years from
the point in time G1 challenges the patent (t
l
g1
= γ · 10 years). If G2 challenges O’s
patent three years later than G1 (so that λ = 0.3), the remaining life of the patent
is 7 years. Thus, G2’s expected entry date under litigation is equal to 1.4 years from
the point in time G2 challenges the patent and 4.4 years from the point in time G1
challenges the patent (tlg2 = γ · 10 years + (1− γ) · λ · 10 years).
For simplification, we assume that no other substitutes are available to the origina-
tors’ patents. Thus, in the absence of generic entry, the market exhibits a monopoly
and O makes profits pim. If G1 enters, the market will exhibit a duopoly and O and
G1 will make profits pi
d
o and pi
d
g . If G2 additionally enters, the market will exhibit a
triopoly and companies will make profits pito and pi
t
g. We assume that all companies
have identical production technologies. However, the profits G1 and G2 can make are
strictly lower than that of O as their products are perceived inferior by consumers.13
11In accordance with our assumption that companies view settlements as superior to litigation, G1
expects G2 to settle or to stay off the market when itself litigates.
12Note that settlements are not necessarily desirable from a consumer welfare perspective as they
only lead to inter partes clarification (among settling parties) while litigations, if the outcome is in
favor of the generic companies, have erga omnis obligation (also apply to third parties). If O and G1
settle, G2 will only be able to enter when it has the means to litigate itself. While if O and G1 litigate
and the patent gets invalidated, G2 will be free to enter immediately. Settlements can, however, not
be prohibited, they can only be regulated.
13For statistics showing that generic products are perceived as inferior by consumers see, e.g.,
European Commission (2008, para. 171, 189, and Table 12).
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Settlements are ruled by courts. The ruling affects the settlement terms, i.e., the
generic entry dates that settling companies agree upon, and generic companies’ incen-
tives to enter and to challenge probabilistic patents in the first place. Specifically, the
more settling companies collude under a rule, meaning the more they delay generic
entry compared to litigation, the higher are their expected settlement profits and thus
generic companies’ incentives to enter.
Collusion increases settling companies’ profits because it implies a prolongation
of monopoly (or duopoly), through which a surplus s is generated. We assume that
settling companies divide this surplus equally among them, that is, the originator
company receives the same share in surplus as any of the generic companies. The
higher the share in surplus that generic companies receive, the higher are their expected
settlement profits, and thus their incentives to enter when collusion is possible.14
We apply the consumer welfare standard to assess which rule is most favorable.
Absent generic entry, the market exhibits a monopoly between t = 0 and t = 1.
Whereas with generic entry, the market exhibits a monopoly between t = 0 and tg1 ,
a duopoly between tg1 and tg2 , and a triopoly between tg2 and t = 1. It follows
that collusion affects consumer welfare negatively as it implies a delay in tg1 and tg2
under each concluded settlement. Collusion may, however, also have a positive effect as
generic companies’ incentives to enter increase, so that more settlements are concluded.
Consumer welfare under the additional settlements is higher than under monopoly
given tg1 < 1 and tg2 ≤ 1, i.e., given collusion is limited. Thus, there exists the trade-
off that the more settling companies collude under a rule, the more competition is
restrained under each concluded settlement, but the higher is the number of concluded
settlements.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we analyze how the choice of the rule affects the degree of collusion
and generic companies’ incentives to enter. To assess the degree of collusion we ask by
how much settling companies delay generic entry compared to litigation. And to assess
generic companies’ incentives to enter we ask for which values of patent strength they
find it profitable to enter.
14In Appendix A3, we do not assume that settling companies share the surplus equally but compute
the Nash Bargaining solution. Under the Nash Bargaining solution generic companies also receive a
positive share in surplus. Note, if they received no share in surplus, collusion would not have an
incentive effect and then the rule of per se illegality would always outperform the rule of reason.
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3.1 Equilibria under the Rule of Per Se Illegality
Under the rule of per se illegality (denoted pi) payments from originator to generic
companies within settlement agreements are per se illegal. The companies can negotiate
over generic entry but originator companies cannot compensate generic companies for a
delay in entry compared to litigation. Because compensations are not possible, no party
is willing to accept less favorable entry terms than the ones expected under litigation.
The companies therefore agree upon tpi = tl. They do not collude. Accordingly, the
companies’ settlement profits are equal to their expected litigation profits:15
pipio ≡ pilo =

γpim + (1− γ)[λpido + (1− λ)pito] if γ ∈ [0, γpig2 ]
γpim + (1− γ)pido if γ ∈ (γpig2 , γpig1 ]
pim if γ ∈ (γpig1 , 1]
pipig1 ≡ pilg1 =

(1− γ)[λpidg + (1− λ)pitg] if γ ∈ [0, γpig2 ]
(1− γ)pidg if γ ∈ (γpig2 , γpig1 ]
0 if γ ∈ (γpig1 , 1]
pipig2 ≡ pilg2 =
 (1− γ)(1− λ)pitg if γ ∈ [0, γ
pi
g2 ]
0 if γ ∈ (γpig2 , 1].
Here, γpig1 and γ
pi
g2
describe the critical values of patent strength for which the generic
companies are indifferent between entering or not. They are defined by
pilg1(γ) +
spi
2
− fg = 0 ⇔ γpig1 = 1−
fg − spi2
pidg
,
pilg2(γ) +
spi
3
− fg = 0 ⇔ γpig2 = 1−
fg − spi3
(1− λ)pitg
.
The surplus, spi, generated through settlements compared to litigations, is zero under
this rule.16 γpig1 and γ
pi
g2
show for which values of patent strength the companies find it
profitable to enter: G1 enters for γ ∈ [0, γpig1 ] and G2 enters for γ ∈ [0, γpig2 ]. Since G2’s
entry decision is delayed, its expected settlement profits are lower than G1’s, and so
γpig2 < γ
pi
g1
. This is illustrated in Figure 1, which plots generic and originator companies’
expected settlement profits (pipio , pi
pi
g1
, pipig2) and their fixed entry costs (fo(γ), fg) against
values of patent strength (γ). We look at a marketplace, in which originators hold
patents that would be declared valid by courts with probabilities γ ∈ [0, 1].
The figure shows that the generic companies’ expected settlement profits decrease
with the probability of patent validity, i.e., with the patents’ strength. This is because
15For simplification we do not consider litigation and settlement costs here but in Appendix A3.
16The surplus is divided by three if G1 and G2 enter and by two if only G1 enters.
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Figure 1: Market outcomes under the rule of per se illegality
the companies will settle upon later entry dates if the probability of patent validity is
higher. For each value of patent strength G1’s expected settlement profits are higher
than that of G2 as it enters earlier. Consequently, G1 can cover the fixed costs fg for
values of patent strength γ ∈ [0, γpig1 ], while G2 can cover fg only for γ ∈ [0, γpig2 ], with
γpig2 < γ
pi
g1
. It follows, when γ ∈ [0, γpig2 ] both generic companies enter. In that case,
monopoly lasts from t = 0 to tpig1 = γ, duopoly from t
pi
g1
= γ to tpig2 = γ + (1 − γ)λ,
and triopoly from tpig2 = γ + (1 − γ)λ to t = 1. Instead, when γ ∈ (γpig2 , γpig1 ] only G1
enters and duopoly lasts from tpig1 = γ to t = 1. Further, when γ ∈ (γpig1 , 1] no generic
company enters and monopoly lasts from t = 0 to t = 1.
Result 1 Under the rule of per se illegality value transfers within settlement agree-
ments are illegal, so that originator companies cannot compensate generic companies
for a delay in entry compared to litigation. The companies settle on generic entry terms
that would in expectation result under litigation. Collusion does not arise.
3.2 Equilibria under the Rule of Per Se Legality
Under the rule of per se legality (denoted pl) payments from originator to generic com-
panies are per se legal. The companies can negotiate over generic entry and originator
companies can compensate generic companies for any delay in entry compared to lit-
igation. They therefore settle on entry terms that maximize their joint profits. Since
10
joint profits,
Πpl = tplg1pi
m + (tplg2 − tplg1)(pido + pidg) + (1− tplg2)(pito + 2pitg),
are an increasing function of tplg1 and t
pl
g2
, they choose the latest possible entry dates,
i.e., tplg1 = t
pl
g2
= 1.17 Monopoly is sustained for the whole patent duration. That is,
collusion is maximal.
Settling companies create a surplus compared to litigation equal to
spl1 = (1− γ)
[
pim − λ(pido + pidg)− (1− λ)(pito + 2pitg)
]
if γ ∈ [0, γplg2 ],
spl2 = (1− γ)
[
pim − pido − pidg
]
if γ ∈ (γplg2 , γplg1 ].
Because the generated surplus is higher than under the rule of per se illegality, the
companies’ expected settlement profits increase. As a result the critical levels of patent
strength, for which the generic companies are indifferent between entering or not, are
higher:
γplg1 = 1−
fg − s
pl
2
2
pidg
and γplg2 = 1−
fg − s
pl
1
3
(1− λ)pitg
.
This means, generic entry takes place more often than under the rule of per se illegality.
However, competition does not enhance due to the additional patent challenges. Under
all concluded settlements monopoly lasts from t = 0 until t = 1.
Result 2 Under the rule of per se legality value transfers within settlement agreements
are legal, so that originator companies can compensate generic companies for a delay
in entry compared to litigation. The companies maximize their joint profits by delaying
generic entry until the end of patent duration. Collusion is maximal.
3.3 Equilibria under the Rule of Reason
The rule of reason (denoted rr) is usually implemented as a three-step process. Initially,
the plaintiffs may show whether there are adverse effects on competition. Subsequently,
the defendants may “establish procompetitive redeeming virtues of the action.” And
finally, the plaintiffs may “show that the same procompetitive effects could not be
achieved through an alternative means that is less restrictive of competition.”18 In
case of patent settlements, plaintiffs can only make use of indicators for adverse ef-
17Agreements determining generic entry dates later than tpl = 1 would be illegal by competition
law as at stage t = 1 the status of the patent terminates. Accordingly, an agreement that guaranteed
to Hoechst Marion Rousselt that its generic competitor, Andrx, would, for the price of $10 million per
quarter, refrain from marketing its generic version of Cardizem CD even after it had obtained FDA
approval, has been judged anticompetitive.
18Citing Clorox Co. vs. Sterling Winthrop, 117 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1997).
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fects on competition in the first step.19 Consequently, the insights that courts obtain
will presumably be incomplete. This means, courts will presumably only have vague
ideas of whether particular settlement agreements are pro- or anticompetitive, mak-
ing consumers better or worse off compared to litigation. Therefore, we assume that
courts predict the expected generic entry dates under litigation with errors , such that
tˆl = tl + .20 These errors, , are uniformly distributed between e and −e, that is,
 ∼ U [−e, e]. An increase in e means courts’ predictions of tl become less precise, or
put differently, the chance that courts approve anticompetitive settlements increases.
Accordingly, courts prohibit settlements if the generic entry date that the companies
agreed upon lies post to the predicted entry date under litigation (trr > tˆl). In case
of prohibition, the companies have to execute less restrictive agreements where such
agreements are available. We assume that the resulting entry terms are neutral in
case of prohibition (trr = tl). We further assume, if courts prohibit a first settlement
between O and G1, they will also prohibit a second settlement between O and G2 that
assigns a corresponding entry date.21 The probability with which courts prohibit first
settlements is
Prob(trrg1 > tˆ
l
g1) = Prob( < t
rr
g1 − γ) =
trrg1 − γ + e
2e
. (1)
Given this probability, companies’ expected joint settlement profits are
Πrr =

trrg1−γ+e
2e
[
γpim + (1− γ)[λ(pido + pidg) + (1− λ)(pito + 2pitg)]
]
+
e−trrg1+γ
2e
[
trrg1pi
m + (1− trrg1)[λ(pido + pidg) + (1− λ)(pito + 2pitg)]
]
, if γ ∈ [0, γrrg2 ],
trrg1−γ+e
2e
[
γpim + (1− γ)(pido + pidg)
]
+
e−trrg1+γ
2e
[
trrg1pi
m + (1− trrg1)(pido + pidg)
]
, if γ ∈ (γrrg2 , γrrg1 ].
The companies maximize these expected joint settlement profits by agreeing upon entry
dates trrg1 = min [γ + e/2 , 1] and t
rr
g2
= min
[
trrg1 + (1− trrg1)λ , 1
]
. This gives us the
following result.
Result 3 Under the rule of reason companies are allowed to transfer values within
19Indicators for adverse effects include the amounts of value transfers relative to the patents’ market
value or the agreed upon generic entry dates. Further, plaintiffs can gather evidence through search for
prior art, and through examinations of backward citations and patent claims in the patent applications.
20It is natural to assume that predictions of tˆl > 1 or tˆl < 0 do not occur as these would be
predictions that a patent is valid with more than 100% or less than 0%, respectively.
21If the first settlement assigns trrg1 , the corresponding entry date of a second settlement would be
trrg2 = t
rr
g1 + (1− trrg1)λ because tlg1 = γ and tlg2 = γ + (1− γ)λ.
12
settlements but courts prohibit settlements which they regard anticompetitive. The less
precisely courts evaluate settlements, the more companies collude because the higher is
the chance that their anticompetitive settlements get approved.
When deciding on generic entry dates settling companies face the following trade-
off. The more they collude, the higher profits they obtain in case of settlement approval
but the higher is also the probability that their settlement gets prohibited. If courts
evaluate settlement agreements more precisely, so that anticompetitive settlements get
more likely prohibited, it will pay less for the companies to choose particularly late
generic entry dates.
In this section, we restrict our attention to the case when companies optimally
choose trrg1 = γ + e/2 < 1.
22 Inserting trrg1 = γ + e/2 into equation (1) shows that
courts approve settlements with probability Prob(trrg1 < tˆ
l
g1
) = 1/4. In that case, the
companies generate a surplus compared to litigation equal to
srr1 =
e
2
[
pim − λ(pido + pidg)− (1− λ)(pito + 2pitg)
]
if γ ∈ [0, γrrg2 ],
srr2 =
e
2
[
pim − pido − pidg
]
if γ ∈ (γrrg2 , γrrg1 ].
The critical levels of patent strength, for which the generic companies are indifferent
between entering or not, are given by
γrrg1 = 1−
fg − s
rr
2
8
pidg
, and γrrg2 = 1−
fg − s
rr
1
12
(1− λ)pitg
.
It is easy to see that the generated surplus and thus the critical levels of patent strength
increase with e, i.e., with the imprecision of antitrust evaluations. The larger e, the
more the companies collude and the higher are generic companies’ incentives to enter.
Result 4 By colluding, settling companies generate a surplus which they can divide
among each other. That way, expected settlement profits increase, and generic compa-
nies obtain additional incentives to enter.
4 Welfare Analysis
A central question of this paper is under which conditions which rule toward pay-
for-delay settlements is preferable from a consumer welfare perspective. The previous
analysis has shown that under the rule of per se legality settling companies sustain
monopoly for the whole patent duration. Thus, initiated challenges do not lead to
22We analyze the case when companies optimally choose trrg1 = 1 in Appendix A1.
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increased competition. For all values of patent strength, monopoly lasts from t = 0 to
t = 1. This is different under the rule of per se illegality and under the rule of reason.
Under these alternative rules initiated challenges of weaker patents lead to increased
competition. Therefore, we obtain the following result.
Result 5 Only under the rule of per se legality patent challenges do not lead to in-
creased competition. Thus, the rule of per se legality yields the lowest consumer welfare.
What remains unanswered is under which conditions the rule of reason or the rule of
per se illegality yields the higher consumer welfare. We know that under these two
rules the companies settle upon:
tpig1 = γ and t
pi
g2 = γ + (1− γ)λ,
trrg1 = γ +
e
2 and t
rr
g2 = γ +
e
2 + (1− γ − e2)λ.
Here, e shows how precisely courts evaluate patent settlements under the rule of reason.
If courts are able to evaluate patent settlements without error, e equals zero. In that
case, generic entry and consumer welfare is the same under both rules. Thus, when a
marginal increase in e, at the point where e = 0, improves consumers welfare under the
rule of reason, patent settlements should be treated under this standard. We obtain
the following the result.
The rule of reason yields higher consumer welfare than the rule of per se illegality
if generic companies’ incentives to challenge probabilistic patents are sufficiently weak,
i.e., if γrrg1 < γ
rr′
g1
≡ ∆1
∆1+2pidg
and γrrg2 < γ
rr′
g2
≡ ∆2
∆2+3(1−λ)pitg with ∆1 = pi
m − pido − pidg
and ∆2 = pi
m − λ(pido + pidg) − (1 − λ)(pito + 2pitg). The proof is relegated to Appendix
B. Proposition 4 shows that central to the condition ensuring that the rule of reason
outperforms the rule of per se illegality is, how strong generic companies’ incentives to
challenge probabilistic patents are. If generic companies’ incentives to enter are low,
the rule of reason likely outperforms the rule of per se illegality. Generic companies’
incentives to enter depend negatively on their fixed entry costs fg and positively on
their expected settlement profits pig (see also Figure 1). As shown in Appendix B, the
condition in Proposition 4 can be rewritten as
fg1 >
2pid
2
g
2pidg + ∆1
and fg2 >
3
(
(1− λ)pitg
)2
(1− λ)pitg + ∆2
.
The fixed costs consist of proving bioequivalence and of bringing forward arguments
why the originator’s patent could potentially be invalid or non-infringed. They vary
with the type of challenge. A non-infringement claim, if readily available, is generally
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easier to conduct than an invalidity claim.23 Generic companies’ expected settlement
profits depend on numerous factors, inter alia on the extent to which consumers per-
ceive generic products as inferior to original products.
The explanation for why the rule of reason outperforms the rule of per se legality
when generic companies’ incentives to enter are low is the following. The rule of reason
outperforms the rule of per se illegality when a marginal increase in e, at the point
where e = 0, has positive welfare implications. A marginal increase of e induces settling
companies to collude. This affects consumer welfare positively when the negative effect
adhered to collusion that under each concluded settlement generic entry is delayed,
is outweighed by the positive effect adhered to collusion that additional settlements
result as generic companies obtain higher incentives to enter. The negative “entry
delay” effect is small when generic companies’ incentives to enter are low because in
that case, overall, few settlements are concluded. Since under each settlement entry is
equally delayed, the total negative effect remains small. At the same time, the positive
“incentive effect” is big when generic companies’ incentives to enter are low because the
additional patents that get challenged are of relatively weak strength, which implies
that under the additional settlements the companies choose relatively early entry dates
and so, competition increases strongly. If, on the other hand, generic companies’
incentives to enter were high and the additional patents that get challenged strong,
companies would choose late generic entry dates under the additional settlements and
so, the degree of competition would only weakly improve.
This can be inferred from Figure 2. Here, consumer welfare (CW ) is plotted against
patent strength (γ). CW c denotes consumer welfare under competition when generic
entry occurs immediately and CWm denotes consumer welfare under monopoly when
generic entry occurs at the end of patent duration. Generic companies enter for values
of patent strength between 0 and γrr. So, a low γrr indicates that generic companies’
incentives to enter are low. The figure shows the effects of successive marginal increases
in e. An increase in e has the negative effect that under each concluded settlement
consumer welfare decreases as the companies delay entry. It can be seen, when γrr
is low, the number of concluded settlements is low, so that the aggregate entry delay
effect remains low. Further, an increase in e has the positive effect that γrr increases,
meaning generic companies obtain higher incentives to enter and additional settlements
23In Schering-Plough vs. FTC, for instance, the active ingredient of Schering-Plough’s pharmaceu-
tical was an unpatented potassium salt, so that two generic companies could relatively easily come up
with alternative, non-infringing means of achieving bioequivalence.
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are concluded. When γrr is low, consumer welfare increases strongly because the
additional patents that get challenged are of relatively low strength, implying that the
companies settle upon early generic entry dates. When entry occurs earlier, consumer
welfare increases by more.
Figure 2: Effects of a marginal increase of e on consumer welfare
5 Welfare Implications of the Hatch-Waxman Act
The welfare analysis showed that the application of the rule of reason toward pay-for-
delay settlements can yield higher consumer welfare than the application of the rule
of per se illegality because settling companies are induced to collude, which increases
generic companies’ expected settlement profits and with it their incentives to challenge
probabilistic patents. Incentivization is achieved through restraints of competition
between originator and generic companies. If there was no lack of incentives, the rule
of reason would clearly yield lower consumer welfare than the rule of per se illegality.
The question arises how strong generic companies’ incentives to challenge contestable
patents are in practice. And moreover, we may bring into question whether it is effective
to let settling parties collude in order to achieve incentivization.
Due to lack of data, researchers have not empirically tested how strong generic
companies’ incentives to challenge probabilistic patents are in practice. We know,
however, if it comes to patent litigation, the risk that the patents will be declared
invalid or non-infringed by courts is substantial. The FTC (2002) calculated that in
73% of Hatch-Waxman cases (see below), the generic company was found not to have
infringed a valid patent.24 This indicates that generic companies are only willing to
24Further information about generic companies’ incentives to challenge probabilistic patents across
countries can be inferred from factors like number of settlements in relation to product market values
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involve originator companies in patent disputes when their chances of winning are
relatively high. Presumably, generic companies only challenge probabilistic patents of
relatively low strength or high commercial value.25
To foster generic entry, competition authorities could alternatively strengthen generic
companies’ market power. For instance, they could encourage the prescription of
generic products. However, in the first instance this would presumably lead to an
increase in the number of generic companies in the market, and thus not necessarily
provide each individual generic company stronger incentives to enter.
A prominent alternative incentive device is the provision of an exclusivity right to
first generic entrants as implemented within the Hatch-Waxman Act (HWA) of 1984
in the US.26 The HWA awards first generic applicants to file an Abbreviated New
Drug Application (ANDA) containing a paragraph IV certification with 180 days of
marketing exclusivity, during which the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) may not
approve a subsequent generic applicant’s ANDA for the same pharmaceutical product
(21 U.S.C. §355(j)(5)(B)(iv)).27
The 180 days of marketing exclusivity implies a restraint of competition between
generic companies. It increases first generic companies’ expected profits and thus
provides them higher incentives to enter and to challenge probabilistic patents, given
subsequent generic companies would have entered.28 The question is, whether it also
provides them higher incentives to challenge additional probabilistic patents. In what
follows, we will show that this is not the case. Since subsequent generic companies’
incentives to enter decline, the effect of the HWA provisions is anticompetitive.
The effect of the HWA provisions is anticompetitive because first generic companies’
incentives to challenge additional probabilistic patents do not improve (γhwag1 ≡ γg1)
but subsequent generic companies’ incentives to challenge probabilistic patents decline
(see, e.g., EC 2008, Figure 97).
25Judge Posner stressed the importance of generic companies’ incentives to challenge patents in
Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharmaceuticals. The Asahi approach has been repeated and approved in
cases Tamoxifen, Schering-Plough vs. FTC, In re Cipro, and further in papers by Balto (2004), and
Schildkraut (2004).
26The Hatch-Waxman Act is formally known as Drug Price Competition and Patent Restauration
Act of 1984, Pub.L.No 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
27The 180-day exclusivity period is calculated from either (i) first commercial marketing by the first
generic applicant, or (ii) a decision of a court holding the relevant patents to be invalid or not infringed.
The marketing exclusivity forfeits and subsequent applicants can enter at the same time as the first
applicant when (i) an appeals court has ruled the relevant patents invalid or not infringed and (ii) 75
days after the effective date or 30 month after application filing elapsed. When the originator files
within 45 days a patent infringement suit against any generic company that submits an ANDA, FDA’s
approval of the ANDA stays for at least 30 month during which time no generic can be launched.
28Apotex, for instance, reported it earned between $150 million and $200 million from its marketing
exclusivity on the antidepressant Paxil.
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(γhwag2 < γg2).
The proof is relegated to Appendix B. It has been presumed that the provision of
exclusivity rights to first generic companies improves their incentives to enter, so that
additional challenges result. However, the HWA provisions only lead to an increase in
first generic companies’ profits, improving their incentives to enter, when they find it
profitable to enter anyway. This is because first generic companies have higher incen-
tives to enter than subsequent generic companies, and the HWA provisions only lead
to restraints of competition when subsequent entry would have occurred.29 Thus, only
when first generic companies find it profitable to enter anyway they obtain additional
profits due to the HWA provisions. Put another way, when first generic companies do
not find it profitable to enter and an increase in their profits would be desirable, leading
to additional patent challenges, subsequent generic companies do not find it profitable
to enter either, and therefore, an exclusivity right that restricts generic competition
does not improve first generic companies’ incentives to enter.
Figure 3: The effect of the hwa provisions on generic companies’ incen-
tives to enter
Note: The drawn through lines show generic companies’ expected settlement profits under the HWA,
while the dotted lines show their expected settlement profits absent the HWA.
The argument is illustrated in Figure 3. It shows that second generic companies’
expected settlement profits and thus their incentives to enter decrease under the HWA
provisions (γhwag2 < γg2). First generic companies’ expected settlement profits, on the
other hand, increase, but only for values of γ ∈ [0, γg2). Since first generic companies’
expected settlement profits do not increase for values of γ ∈ (γg2 , 1] their incentives to
29Subsequent generic companies have lower incentives to enter than first generic companies as their
entry is delayed (λ > 0).
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enter remain unchanged (γhwag1 ≡ γg1).
Arguably, if second generic companies obtained, despite their entry delay, higher
settlement profits than first generic companies (e.g., due to lower fixed entry costs or
higher productive efficiency), the HWA would be effective in providing first generic
companies incentives to enter for additional probabilistic patents. In that case, such
incentivization would, however, not improve consumer welfare either as first generic
companies would challenge additional probabilistic patents that second generic com-
panies would challenge absent the HWA provisions anyway, since in that case second
generic companies have higher incentives to enter than first generic companies (i.e.,
γg2 > γg1).
Further, one could argue that the HWA provisions lead to earlier entry by first
generic companies as they provide generic companies additional incentives to be the first
in the market. Similar to the effect that patent races have on entry dates of originator
companies, the award of an exclusivity right to first generic companies might have an
effect on entry dates of first generic companies. But even if this was the case, earlier
entry of first generic companies would be accompanied by later entry of subsequent
generic companies.
It follows that due to the HWA provisions no additional patents get challenged,
fewer patents get challenged by both generic companies and, further, if patents get
challenged by both generic companies, entry by second generic companies is delayed.
We can therefore conclude that the HWA provisions do not establish the desired in-
centive effect, they only restrict competition when this is undesirable. Therefore, we
recommend to abolish the provision of exclusivity rights to first generic entrants.30
6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss our results. We ask whether the problem of anticompetitive
pay-for-delay settlements could be alleviated by raising patent quality across-the-board.
We explain problems adhered to the rule of reason approach. And further, we ask
30Because the HWA provisions have the additional detrimental effect that originator companies
basically only need to pay to delay entry by first generic companies in order to also delay entry
by subsequent generic companies, Lemley and Hemphill (2011) suggest that first generic companies
should only be awarded with an exclusivity right if they successfully defeat the originator companies
(e.g., by invalidating their patents). We would like to point out that this kind of regulation would have
the additional beneficial effect that generic companies’ incentives to litigate would increase. When
first generic companies are successful in litigations, this benefits subsequent generic companies and
leads to increased competition overall (see supra note 12).
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whether in case of pay-for-delay settlements static efficiency is an acceptable criterion
for long-run consumer welfare.
6.1 Patent Quality and Effective Opposition
We showed that patent settlements are a means to restrict competition. Arguably,
policymakers could get to the root of the problem by strengthening the examination
process, thereby raising patent quality across-the-board. Better funding of patent ex-
aminations, higher standards for initial review, better incentives that make it easier
and more desirable for examiners to reject rather than grant patents and better in-
centives for applicants to disclose prior art could weed out weak patents in the first
place. As several authors have stated, though, the optimal error rate at a patent office
is in fact not zero. Because only very few patents have commercial significance per-
fect examination would not be cost effective.31 Since patent offices lack information
about which patents matter ahead of time they also cannot focus their examinations
on the few important patents. Thus, government relies on litigation and on an effective
opposition system to fix all errors.32 However, as we pointed out in this paper, once
an error has been made in the examination process and a patent dispute arises, the
problem emerges that generic companies actually do not have incentives to litigate or
make use of an opposition system, inducing a second review process, but to settle their
disputes out of court. As long as courts apply the rule of per se legality toward pay-
for-delay settlements, errors made in the examination process are not corrected for to
the detriment of consumers. Thus, there is an urgent need to reconsider patent law’s
presumption of validity and to control patent settlements by competition authorities.
Only the rule of reason and the rule of per se illegality provide an effective mechanism
to correct for errors made in the examination process.
6.2 Problems Adhered to the Rule of Reason Approach
A drawback of the rule of reason approach is that ex post competition authorities have
an incentive to prohibit every pay-for-delay settlement, knowing that it is optimal
for companies to settle on anticompetitive terms. As a consequence, e, which shows
to which degree antitrust evaluations of pay-for-delay settlements are subject to error,
31Lemley (2001) points out that ninety-five percent of patents will either never be used, or will be
used in circumstances that do not crucially rely on the determination of validity.
32For information on the opposition systems in the US and in the EU see, e.g., Harhoff, Scherer and
Vopel (2003), Farrell and Merges (2004) and USPTO (2009).
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might become very small, even smaller than the theoretically optimal e.33 However, low
levels of e are desirable because they are likely to cause high positive incentive and low
negative entry delay effects. In contrast, high levels of e evidently lead to welfare losses
as the negative entry delay effects grow so large that they cannot be outweighed by
the positive incentive effects. So the commitment problem faced by antitrust enforcers
when evaluating pay-for-delay settlements could in fact help to implement desirable
levels of e.
It should be further noted that antitrust enforcers are likely to face practical dif-
ficulties implementing the optimal level of e anyway. The optimal level of e depends
on many different factors and fine-tuning on e is only possible through gathering more
information on the merits of each case.34 Therefore, it could make sense to implement
alternatively to the rule of reason, a per se rule, under which value transfers from
originator to generic companies within settlement agreements are permitted up to a
specific amount. Such an approach would have similar beneficial effects as the rule of
reason approach but would simplify matters. By linking the permitted value transfers
to originator companies’ returns and keeping the permitted amounts generally low,
competition authorities could appropriately balance entry delay against generic com-
panies’ incentives to challenge probabilistic patents, and at the same time assure legal
certainty. Also, the administration costs would be lower than under a full-fledged rule
of reason analysis.
6.3 Static vs. Dynamic Efficiency
In the welfare analysis we focused on static efficiency, neglecting effects that the choice
of rule might have on dynamic efficiency. Static efficiency means economic efficiency at
a static level, resulting from competition among existing products, whereas dynamic
efficiency means economic efficiency at a dynamic level, resulting from the creation
of new products. Antitrust law is mainly concerned with static efficiency, defend-
ing market competition, whereas patent law is mainly concerned with dynamic effi-
ciency, conferring market power to innovating companies. The basis for patent law
is the Schumpeterian argument, which contends that the prospect of market power
33The optimal “evaluation error” e is derived in Appendix A2.
34Alternatively, competition authorities could prevent companies from choosing highly anticom-
petitive settlement terms by imposing a fine which the companies have to pay in case of settlement
prohibition or by imposing an ad valorem tax on payments made by originator companies. These
measures would make collusion more costly for the companies, so that in effect the companies would
collude less.
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incentivizes companies to innovate. Accordingly, while competition promotes static
efficiency, it might infer with dynamic efficiency. Different long-run consumer welfare
implications might arise when considering dynamic efficiency. There are, however, a
number of reasons one should not rely exclusively on the Schumpetarian argument. In
some situations competition rather than the promise of market power promotes dy-
namic efficiency as it pushes companies to adopt the most efficient technologies and to
invest in R&D.35 Competition often spurs faster innovation and induces companies to
innovate in different ways, resulting in a variety of different technologies. Thus, static
and dynamic efficiency may go hand in hand.
When conducting a welfare analysis, we should nevertheless assess in case of re-
straints of competition how these restraints affect dynamic efficiency. Under the rule
of per se legality and under the rule of reason competition is restrained due to collu-
sion. So, the question arises whether collusion under these rules promotes or impairs
dynamic efficiency. According to the Schumpeterian argument, originator companies
might be incentivized to innovate due to the additional profits they can obtain by col-
luding. However, there is also an argument to the contrary. Dynamic efficiency might
impair as the possibility of collusion effects that originator companies obtain relatively
high profits when holding weak patents. Under the rule of per se legality, originator
companies profit from collusion more if their patents are weaker. And also under the
rule of reason, originator companies only profit from collusion when holding weak and
not ironclad patents. This might cause originator companies to invest more in weak
instead of ironclad patents. Since the effect of collusion on dynamic efficiency is not
clear from the outset, this is a topic for further research.
7 Concluding Remarks
In the EU, regulation of pay-for-delay settlements is still in its infancy. US courts apply
the rule of per se legality toward pay-for-delay settlements. This leads to tremendous
welfare losses as settling companies are able to use probabilistic patent terms to legiti-
mate restraints of competition.36 As an alternative to the rule of per se legality, courts
could apply the rule of per se illegality, prohibiting settlement agreements that involve
value transfers from originator to generic companies, or the rule of reason, evaluating
35This argument has long been associated with Arrow (1962).
36According to the FTC’s estimations the costs to consumers in the US increase through pay-for-
delay settlements by approximately $3.5 billion each year (see Brief of the United States, available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f259300/259325.htm).
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pro- against anticompetitive settlement effects. We showed that in contrast to the
rule of per se illegality, the rule of reason induces limited collusion between settling
companies when antitrust enforcement under this rule is imperfect. On the one hand,
this affects consumer welfare negatively as generic entry under each settlement is de-
layed. On the other hand, it affects consumer welfare positively as companies’ expected
settlement profits increase, which provides generic companies additional incentives to
challenge probabilistic patents. Additional settlement agreements are concluded where
otherwise the holders of probabilistic patents would remain monopolists. We showed
that if generic companies’ incentives to challenge probabilistic patents are low, the
negative entry delay effect is outweighed by the positive incentive effect, so that the
rule of reason yields higher consumer welfare than the rule of per se illegality.
Under the rule of reason generic entry is promoted through restraints of compe-
tition between originator and generic companies. Instead, the Hatch-Waxman Act of
1984 aims to promote generic entry through restraints of competition between generic
companies. More specifically, first generic companies are awarded with an exclusivity
right, which restricts entry by subsequent generic companies. The analysis revealed
that this very prominent incentive device fails to have the desired effect. An increase
in first generic companies’ profits through restraints of competition would be desirable
and would indeed lead to additional patent challenges when first generic companies do
not find it profitable to enter otherwise. In these cases, however, subsequent generic
companies also do not find it profitable to enter as they usually have lower incentives
to enter than first generic companies as their entry is delayed. Thus, the provision of
an exclusivity right to first generic companies is effectless in these cases. It still has
the effect that competition is restrained when subsequent generic companies find it
profitable to enter. Therefore, we recommend to abolish this regulation.
Although our analysis has shown that the application of antitrust rules toward pay-
for-delay settlements would be beneficial from a consumer welfare perspective, it is very
difficult to justify the application of antitrust rules toward pay-for-delay settlements
in front of courts. This is because pay-for-delay settlements involve (probabilistic but)
valid patents. Thus, further legal research needs to be done in this direction.
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8 Appendix A: Extensions
A1: Settlements under the Rule of Reason when γ > 1− e2
In this appendix, we show that the results computed in Sections 3.3 and 4 for the rule
of reason only hold for the case γ > 1− e/2 when the critical level of patent strength,
for which G1 is indifferent between entering or not, does not exceed γ + e/2.
When γ > 1 − e/2 settling companies optimally choose trr′g1 = trr
′
g2
= 1 under the
rule of reason. Inserting trr
′
g1
= 1 into equation (1) shows that courts then prohibit first
settlements with probability Prob(trr
′
> tˆl) = (1 − γ + e)/2e. The critical levels of
patent strength, for which the generic companies are indifferent between entering or
not, change to
γrr
′
g1 =
fg − s
rr′
2 +24
2 e− pidg
1− pidg
, and
γrr
′
g2 =
fg − s
rr′
1 +24
3 e− (1− λ)pitg
1− (1− λ)pitg
,
when they exceed 1 − e/2. Then, the rule of per se illegality always yields higher
consumer welfare than the rule of reason because an increase in e only has a negative
entry delay but no positive incentive effect. A negative entry delay effect arises because
settling parties are induced to collude more for values of patent strength below 1− e
2
.
A positive incentive effect, however, does not arise because settling parties are not
induced to collude more for values of patent strength above 1 − e
2
. For these values
settling companies constantly choose trr
′
= 1, regardless of whether e increases or not.
Thus, generic companies’ expected settlement profits do not increase with an increase
in e for values around γrr
′
g1
and γrr
′
g2
, and so their incentives to enter remain unchanged.
When the critical levels of patent strength for which the generic companies are
indifferent between entering or not do not exceed 1 − e
2
, monopoly results for all γ-
units above 1−e/2. In that case, an increase in e still has the same effects as described
in Sections 3.3 and 4. It induces settling companies to collude more for values around
γrr
′
g1
and γrr
′
g2
and, thus, enhances generic companies’ incentives to enter.
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A2: The Socially Optimal Level of e
Consumer welfare under the rule of reason approach is given by equation (5). Differ-
entiating consumer welfare with respect to e yields
∂CW rr
∂e
=
∂γrrg1
∂e
(
1− γrrg1 −
e
8
)(
CW d − CWm
)
− γ
rr
g1
8
(
CW d − CWm
)
(2)
+
∂γrrg2
∂e
(
1− γrrg2 −
e
8
)
(1− λ)
(
CW t − CW d
)
− γ
rr
g2
8
(1− λ)
(
CW t − CW d
)
.
For the derivation of the consumer welfare maximizing level of e we assume that the
companies compete in quantities. The originator companies’ inverse demand function
is given by po = 1 − q, and the generic companies’ inverse demand function is given
by pg = α − q, with 0.5 ≤ α ≤ 1 and q = qo +
∑2
i=1 qgi . The differentiation factor α
reflects the degree to which the generic products are perceived inferior to the original
product by consumers. The lower α is, the more demand originator companies receive
in comparison to generic companies when charging the same price.
We can substitute
γrrg2 =
(2α− 1)(63− 19λ− 2α(27− 7λ))e− 216(16fg + (4(1− α)α− 1)(1− λ))
216(1− 2α)2(1− λ) ,
γrrg1 =
64((1− 2α)2 − 9fg) + (4(8− 5α)α− 11)e
64(1− 2α)2 ,
CWm = 1/8, CW d = ((1 + α)/3)2, and CW t = 3/8 α2 + 3/8 α + 3/32 into equation (2)
and solve it for e. This gives us the consumer welfare maximizing level of e:
e∗ =
[
1728(486(2α− 1)3(12α(1 + α)− 1)− 9(2α(3383 + 6484α+ 648α2)− 721)fg
+ (−108(2α− 1)3(76α+ 92α2 − 7) + (551 + 2α(4α(8253 + 13618α))− 3729)fg)λ
+ 54(2α− 1)3(44α+ 76α2 − 5)λ2)]/[
(2α− 1)(81(65 + 4α(2125 + α(648α(23α− 3)− 19201)))
− 9(4α(82869 + α(8α(29079α− 19531)− 204777))− 22535)λ
+ 16(14α− 19)(94α− 35)(44α+ 76α2 − 5)λ2)].
It shows, that e∗ decreases with generic companies’ fixed entry costs (fg), i.e., with
generic companies’ incentives to enter. Further, e∗ increases with the delay of G2’s
entry decision (λ) and with the degree to which generic products are perceived inferior
to original products by consumers (α). This means, the higher fg and λ and the lower
α, the more consumer welfare increases when antitrust evaluations of pay-for-delay
settlements under the rule of reason are subject to error.
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A3: Litigation Costs and Expectational Asymmetry
This appendix analyzes the level of collusion and generic companies’ incentives to
challenge probabilistic patents under the consideration of (i) litigation and settlement
costs (l ≥ ς) and (ii) originator and generic companies misconceiving their respective
likelihoods of success in the litigations (γo Q γ, γg Q γ). For simplification we assume
in this and the following appendix that only one generic company seeks market entry.
The underlying economic intuition of our results remains the same. While we assumed
before that companies divide any surplus they generate through settlements compared
to litigation by the number of companies involved in the settlement talks, we here
compute the Nash Bargaining solutions.
Expected litigation profits of originator and generic companies are
pilo = γopi
m + (1− γo)pido − l,
pilg = (1− γg)pidg − l.
The companies’ expected profits pursuant to a settlement under the rule of per se
illegality (payment P = 0) and under the rule of per se legality (payment P ≥ 0) are
pio = tpi
m + (1− t)pido − P − ς,
pig = (1− t)pidg + P − ς.
The Nash bargaining solution is determined by
max
t
(
pio − pilo
)(
pig − pilg
)
.
As negotiated entry date in the Nash bargaining solution we receive
t =
γo + γg
2
+
(l − ς)(pim − pido − pidg)
2(pim − pido)pidg
+
P (pim − pido + pidg)
2(pim − pido)pidg
. (3)
In what follows, we analyze the effects of γo, γg, l and ς on the degree of collusion and
the generic companies’ incentives to enter.
Under the rule of per se legality originator companies are allowed to make payments
to generic companies (P ≥ 0). Since originator companies can compensate generic
companies for any delay in entry compared to litigation, the companies settle on entry
terms that maximize their joint profits and negotiate about the division of the generated
surplus. They choose tpl = 1 as generic entry date, independent of their individual
perceptions of patent strength and of litigation and settlement costs. Since the degree
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of collusion remains the same, the welfare implications also remain the same.
Under the rule of per se illegality P equals 0 as payments from originator to generic
companies are not allowed. Hence, companies settle upon
tpi =
γo + γg
2
+
(l − ς)(pim − pido − pidg)
2(pim − pido)pidg
.
Differentiating tpi with respect to (γo +γg)/2 and l− ς shows that the level of collusion
under the rule of per se illegality increases with originator companies being relatively
confident and generic companies being relatively unconfident regarding their chances
of winning litigation. Further, collusion increases with the difference between litigation
and settlement costs.
Generic companies’ expected settlement profits are
pipig =
(
1− γo + γg
2
− (l − ς)(pi
m − pido − pidg)
2(pim − pido)pidg
)
pidg − ς.
Thus, the less confident originator companies and the more confident generic compa-
nies, the higher are generic companies’ incentives to enter. Further, the lower litigation
and settlement costs, the higher are generic companies’ incentives to enter.
Under the rule of reason originator companies are allowed to make payments to generic
companies, so that P ≥ 0. Settling companies choose entry terms that maximize their
expected joint profits and then negotiate about the division of the generated surplus.
The companies’ expected settlement profits are
pirro =
trr − γo + e
2e
[
γopi
m + (1− γo)pido
]
+
e− trr + γo
2e
[
trrpim + (1− trr)pido − P
]
− ς and
pirrg =
trr − γg + e
2e
(1− γg)pidg +
e− trr + γg
2e
[
(1− trr)pidg + P
]
− ς.
Thus, they choose as generic entry dates
trr =
γo(pi
m − pido)− γgpidg
pim − pido − pidg
+
e
2
.
It follows that the degree of collusion increases with the companies’ overconfidence but
is independent of litigation and settlement costs.
As under the rule of per se illegality, generic companies’ incentives to enter decrease
with originator companies’ confidence and increase with their own confidence. Further,
generic companies’ incentives to enter decrease with litigation and settlement costs.
From the analysis we can derive the following policy implications. The higher litigation
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costs relative to settlement costs, the more settling companies collude under the rule
of per se illegality, so that in comparison the rule of reason becomes more desirable.
If originator companies are overconfident, collusion under the rule of per se illegality
and under the rule of reason increases. Under the rule of reason collusion increases by
more but through prohibitions of settlements neutral outcomes can still be achieved.
Further, the higher litigation costs relative to settlement costs, the lower are generic
companies’ incentives to challenge probabilistic patents under the rule of per se illegality
and under the rule of reason. It follows, that incentivization as achieved under the rule
of reason becomes more desirable. The same applies if originator companies become
more overconfident or generic companies less confident. In that case, generic companies’
bargaining position is weakened, which derogates their incentives to enter.
A4: Risk Aversion
Contrary to settlement, litigation poses a risk to companies. Generic companies risk
early versus late flow of profits and originator companies risk early versus late loss
of monopoly profits. Companies that have more to risk or that are more risk averse
tend to accept less favorable settlement terms in order to avoid that settlement fails.
Absent any compensation generic companies, which prefer earlier entry to later, might
be willing to postpone entry somewhat past the expected entry date under litigation
if the postponement is not so protracted that the cost to it in lost profits is more
than what is saved in avoided risk. Similarly, originator companies, which prefer later
entry to earlier, might be willing to accelerate entry relative to the expected generic
entry date under litigation. Because risk aversion has the same effect as an increase in
litigation costs we treat the cost of bearing risk as a “risk premium”.
In the US, generic companies have not made infringing sales that would give rise
to claims for damages or incurred production costs when triggering a patent dispute.
Hence, their litigation risk may be rather small.37 They only may risk bankruptcy when
litigation takes too long. Originator companies face potentially larger consequences if
they lose litigation as their profits would drop dramatically. The bargaining strength
of companies that bear a higher risk is weakened.
Under the rule of per se illegality (P=0) and under the rule of reason (P≥0) the
37In the EU, generic companies either enter at risk or await a declaratory judgment (after having
indicated their intention to enter and received a notice by the originator company that it intends to sue
the generic companies for infringement in case of entry). The prerequisites for declaratory judgments
differ among EU states.
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assumption of lo 6= lg takes the following effects. Expected litigation profits are
pilo = γpi
m + (1− γ)pido − lo,
pilg = (1− γ)pidg − lg.
The companies’ expected profits pursuant to a settlement are
pio = tpi
m + (1− t)pido − P − ς,
pig = (1− t)pidg + P − ς.
As Nash bargaining solution we receive
t = γ − lo
2(pim − pido)
+
lg
2pidg
− ς(pi
m − pido − pidg)
2(pim − pido)pidg
+
P (pim − pido + pidg)
2(pim − pido)pidg
. (4)
It follows that under the rule of per se illegality settlements become more procompet-
itive when originator companies’ litigation costs increase, and more anticompetitive
when generic companies’ litigation costs increase. In line with the results of the pre-
vious appendix, collusion under the rule of per se illegality decreases compared to
under the rule of reason when the originator companies become more risk averse. This
means, the rule of per se illegality becomes more favorable compared to the rule of
reason. The opposite is true, and the rule of reason becomes more favorable, when
generic companies become more risk averse.
As generic companies’ bargaining position is strengthened when originator com-
panies become more risk averse, their incentives to enter improve. Incentivization,
as achieved under the rule of reason, becomes less important. Thus, when originator
companies become more risk averse the rule of per se illegality prevails. Again, the
opposite is true and the rule of reason becomes more favorable when generic companies
become more risk averse.
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9 Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.1
In order to judge whether the rule of reason or the rule of per se illegality is preferable
we need to analyze whether consumer welfare is higher under the rule of reason when
e = 0 or when e > 0. We therefore look at whether a marginal increase in e, given
e = 0 in the first place, has positive welfare implications.
Consumer welfare under the rule of reason is
CW rr =
∫ γrrg2 (e)
0
[
3
4
[
γCWm + (1− γ) [λCW d + (1− λ)CW t]]
+
1
4
[(
γ +
e
2
)
CWm +
(
1− γ − e
2
) [
λCW d + (1− λ)CW t]] ] dγ
+
∫ γrrg1 (e)
γrrg2
(e)
[
3
4
[
γCWm + (1− γ)CW d]+ 1
4
[(
γ +
e
2
)
CWm +
(
1− γ − e
2
)
CW d
] ]
dγ
+
∫ 1
γrrg1
(e)
CWm dγ
=
[(
1− e
8
)
γrrg2 (e)−
γrrg2 (e)
2
2
]
(1− λ)(CW t − CW d)
+
[(
1− e
8
)
γrrg1 (e)−
γrrg1 (e)
2
2
]
(CW d − CWm) + CWm. (5)
Thus, the effect of a marginal increase in e on consumer welfare is
∂CW rr
∂e
=
∂γrrg1
∂e
(
1− γrrg1 −
e
8
) (
CW d − CWm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Incentive Effect−G1
− γ
rr
g1
8
(
CW d − CWm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entry Delay Effect−G1
(6)
+
∂γrrg2
∂e
(
1− γrrg2 −
e
8
)
(1− λ) (CW t − CW d)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Incentive Effect−G2
− γ
rr
g2
8
(1− λ) (CW t − CW d)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entry Delay Effect−G2
.
Equation (6) shows, when e (the imprecision of antitrust enforcement under the rule of
reason) increases, settling companies agree upon later generic entry dates than under
the rule of per se illegality, i.e., they collude more. Under each settlement competition
is restrained, which leads to consumer welfare losses. As shown by equation (6), for
all values of patent strength for which settlements would also result absent an increase
in e, that is for all intramarginal γrrg1 - and γ
rr
g2
-units, consumer welfare decreases by
1/8
(
CW d − CWm) and 1/8 (1− λ) (CW t − CW d), respectively.
Through collusion the companies’ expected settlement profits increase and with
it the critical levels of patent strength for which the generic companies are indiffer-
ent between entering or not (γrrg1 and γ
rr
g2
). The generic companies find it profitable
to also contest patents of higher strength. This affects consumer welfare positively
30
when collusion under the additional settlements is limited. As shown by equation
(6), a marginal increase in e leads to an increase in γrrg1 by ∂γ
rr
g1
/∂e, meaning first
generic companies enter for additional ∂γrrg1/∂e units. For each of these units con-
sumer welfare increases by
(
1− γrrg1 − e/8
) (
CW d − CWm). A marginal increase in
e also leads to an increase in γrrg2 by ∂γ
rr
g2
/∂e. Thus, second generic companies enter
for additional ∂γrrg2/∂e units. For each of these units consumer welfare increases by(
1− γrrg2 − e/8
)
(1− λ) (CW t − CW d).
Thus, the imperfection of antitrust enforcement under the rule of reason has two
countervailing effects on consumer welfare. It induces settling parties to delay entry,
affecting consumer welfare negatively. At the same time, it enhances generic companies’
incentives to challenge probabilistic patents, affecting consumer welfare positively.
Next, we analyze under which conditions the negative entry delay effect of a marginal
increase in e is outweighed by the positive incentive effect, implying that the rule of
reason outperforms the rule of per se illegality. This is the case when the marginal
effect of an increase in e on consumer welfare is positive, given e = 0 in the first place.
Setting the first line of equation (6) equal to zero, inserting e = 0, and solving for γrrg1
yields
γrr
′
g1 ≡
∆1
∆1 + 2pidg
,
where ∆1 = pi
m − pido − pidg . Accordingly, setting the second line of equation (6) equal
to zero, inserting e = 0, and solving for γrrg2 yields
γrr
′
g2 ≡
∆2
∆2 + 3(1− λ)pitg
,
where ∆2 = pi
m − λ(pido + pidg) − (1 − λ)(pito + 2pitg). It follows that consumer welfare is
higher under the rule of reason than under the rule of per se illegality when γrrg1 < γ
rr′
g1
and γrrg2 < γ
rr′
g2
.
We can further specify these conditions by substituting in γrrg1 = 1 − fg/pidg and
γrrg2 = 1 − fg/(1 − λ)pitg. We obtain that the rule of reason yields higher consumer
welfare than the rule of per se illegality if
fg1 >
2pid
2
g
2pidg + ∆1
and fg2 >
3
(
(1− λ)pitg
)2
(1− λ)pitg + ∆2
. 
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Proof of Proposition 1.2
The proof that the HWA provisions have anticompetitive effects proceeds in two steps.
We first show that the HWA provisions alleviate second generic companies’ incentives
to enter (γhwag2 < γg2). We then show that the HWA provisions do not provide first
generic companies additional incentives to enter (γhwag1 ≡ γg1).
When the HWA provisions apply, G2’s expected entry date under litigation post-
pones to t
l|hwa
g2 = γ+(1−γ)(λ+ν), where ν denotes the 180 days marketing exclusivity
period during which the FDA may not approve any subsequent ANDA. When G2 wants
to enter and G1 settled with O before, G2 has to file an ANDA (para. IV), whereupon
it can be sued by O for infringement. With probability γ G2 would then loose litigation
and enter at time t = 1, whereas with probability (1−γ) it would win litigation, trigger
the 180 days exclusivity period at time t = λ, and enter at time t = λ+ ν.
Because G2’s expected entry date under litigation postpones, it has less negotiation
power and therefore settles with O on later entry dates. Under the rule of reason O
and G2 agree upon t
rr|hwa
g2 = γ + e/2 + (1− γ − e/2)(λ+ ν), whereas under the rule of
per se illegality they agree upon t
pi|hwa
g2 = γ + (1− γ)(λ+ ν).
Under the rule of reason not only G2’s entry date postpones, the companies also
generate a lower surplus when G2 finds it profitable to enter:
s
rr|hwa
1 =
e
2
[
pim − (λ+ ν)(pido + pidg)− (1− λ− ν)(pito + 2pitg)
]
.
Because G2’s entry date postpones and a lower settlement surplus is generated when
it enters, its incentives to enter deplete. That is, the critical level of patent strength,
for which G2 is indifferent between entering or not, decreases to
γrr|hwag2 = 1−
fg − s
rr|hwa
1
12
(1− λ− ν)pitg
< γrrg2 .
Under the rule of per se illegality, settling companies still generate no surplus, i.e.,
spi|hwa ≡ spi = 0. But since G2’s entry date postpones, the critical level of patent
strength, for which G2 is indifferent between entering or not, decreases to
γpi|hwag2 = 1−
fg − spi|hwa3
(1− λ− ν)pitg
< γpig2 .
Next, we analyze whether the HWA provisions provide G1 incentives to challenge
patents that it would not challenge otherwise, i.e., patents of strength γ ∈ (γg1 , 1].
This would be the case if G1’s expected settlement profits increased due to the HWA
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provisions for patents of strength γ ∈ (γg1 , 1]. Indeed, G1’s expected settlement increase
due to the HWA provisions for patents of strength γ ∈ (0, γg2 ], as for these values
competition between G1 and G2 is restrained as either G2 enters at a later point in
time (if γ ∈ [0, γhwag2 ]), or G2 does not enter at all (if γ ∈ (γhwag2 , γg2 ]). However, since
γg2 < γg1 G1’s expected settlement do not increase for patents of strength γ ∈ (γg1 , 1]
as for these patents G2 would also, even absent the HWA provisions, not enter. An
exclusivity right that restricts competitions between G1 and G2 is effectless here, as
competition would not arise anyway. Therefore, G1’s incentives to challenge additional
patents of strength γ ∈ (γg1 , 1] do not improve, that is, γhwag1 ≡ γg1 .
Note that under the rule of per se legality basically the same mechanisms apply.
But an increase in generic companies’ incentives to enter would not have a positive
effect on consumer welfare anyway as collusion under this rule is maximal. 
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